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AGE DISCRIMINATION AND INCOME-SECURITY BENEFITS:
THE LONG RETREAT FROM TfTREAULT-GADOURY?
MEL COUSINS*
RiksuMt
En 1991, la Cour supreme du Canada a rendu un jugement historique dans 'affaire
Ttreault-Gadoury c. Canada (Commission de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration) en d6-
cidant que la cessation statutaire des prestations de l'assurance emploi i l'&ge de 65
ans constituait une violation de la garantie d'galit6 contenue dans l'article 15 dont
la justification ne peut etre d~montre dans le cadre d'une soci~t6 libre et democrat-
ique, en accord avec l'article 1 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertis. En 1999,
le support de la garantie a W affaibli lorsque, dans l'affaire Law c. Canada (Ministre
de l'Emploi et de l'Immigration), la Cour supreme importa une analyse contextuelle
de la discrimination dans 'article 15 de la Charte. Depuis lors, la jurisprudence a
commenc6 i se distancer de Ttreault-Gadoury, au point oi, en 2007, la Cour d'appel
du Nouveau-Brunswick a 6mis des doutes quant au fait de savoir si l'affaire Titreault-
Gadoury demeurait encore applicable au vu de l'analyse Law.
L'auteur fait une comparaison entre ranalyse de l'article 1 entreprise par la Cour su-
preme dans Ttreault-Gadoury et l'analyse contextuelle de l'article 15 demand~e par
Law, et arrive a. la conclusion qu'il existe suffisamment de similarit6 entre les facteurs
sous-jacents pour donner a penser que Ttreault-Gadoury pourrait bien r6ussir une
analyse Law si elle 6tait faite aujourd'hui. Cependant, l'auteur ajoute qu'il semble
improbable que les tribunaux canadiens seraient dispos6s A 6tendre le verdict de
discrimination d'autres programmes de s6curit6 du revenu qui chevauchent l'age
de retraite normale, et suggbre que la disposition des tribunaux a donner de tels ver-
dicts de discrimination relkve moins de facteurs contextuels et plus des perspectives
d'ensemble de la Cour supreme du Canada quant au degr6 de droit de regard qu'elle
devrait exercer sur l'action de l'tPtat.
INTRODUCTION
Age discrimination has played a prominent role in equality jurisprudence under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 particularly in comparison with other
jurisdictions such as the European Court of Human Rights or the U.S. Supreme
Mel Cousins B.L., School of Law and Social Sciences, Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland.
1. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Char-
ter].
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Court. In part, at least, this prominence arises because age is an enumerated ground
of discrimination that is prohibited under s. 15 of the Charter.2
Looking specifically at the issue of income-security benefits, there have been some
cases in which courts have struck down particular provisions as inconsistent with the
Charter on age grounds.3 One of the most important decisions on age discrimina-
tion in the context of income-security benefits was the case of Titreault-Gadoury v.
Canada (Employment and Immigration Commission) (1991), 4 in which the Supreme
Court struck down an age restriction in the Unemployment Insurance Act5 that
removed persons aged sixty-five and over from normal unemployment insurance
benefits and instead provided them with a small lump-sum retirement benefit. While
Titreault-Gadoury has never been explicitly called into question by the Supreme
Court, it predates the now standard approach to the application of the equality clause
set out by the Supreme Court of Canada.
In successive cases, the court has dealt with differences in the delivery of income-
security programs based on age. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration)6 (1999) and Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General)7 (2002) both upheld
the constitutional validity of income-security programs that differentiated on the
basis of age to the disadvantage of younger persons. These age-based discrimination
decisions are so important to Canadian constitutional litigation that author Peter
Hogg notes, "Since 1999, every case has followed the Law analysis, and looked for an
impairment of human dignity. Law has supplanted Andrews as the leading case on s.
15-8
2. In contrast, age is not specifically mentioned in Article 14 (non-discrimination) of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. (Nevertheless, the European Court of Human Rights does consider argu-
ments on the basis of age discrimination-presumably on the basis that this falls under "other status" in
Article 14). Nor has age been recognized as a suspect ground under U.S. constitutional jurisprudence
(see e.g. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976)), although
a number of state courts have struck down provisions similar to those discussed in this note (see e.g.
Golden v. Westark Community College, 333 Ark. 41, 969 S.W 2d 154 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 1998); Pierce v.
Lafourche Parish Council, 762 So.2d 608 (La. Sup. Ct. 2000); and Reesor v. Montana State Fund, 2004
Mont. 1, 103 P3d 1019 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 2004), although other courts have upheld such provisions).
3. In addition to Titreault-Gadoury, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22, 1991 CanLII 12, which is discussed in more detail
in the text, see also Clemons v. Winnipeg (City) (1994), 93 Man.R. (2d) 287, 114 DLR (4th) 702 (Q.B.),
rev'd (1995), 100 Man.R. (2d) 64, 122 D.L.R. (4th) 676 (C.A.), where the Manitoba Court of Queen's
Bench held that a policy of refusing social assistance to persons under eighteen was in breach of the
Charter. This decision was reversed on appeal, on grounds that an application for Charter relief was
premature because all administrative remedies had not yet been exhausted.
4. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22,1991 CanLII 12 [Titreault-Gadoury].
5. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48 [Act], which has been long since repealed and replaced with the Employment
Insurance Act, S.C. 1996, c. 23.
6. [1999] 1 SCR 497, 1999 CanLII 675 [Law].
7. 2002SCC84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 [Gosselin]
8. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed., looseleaf (Scarborough: Thomson Carswell,
2007), vol. 2 at para. 55.9(b).
Age Discrimination and Income-Security Benefits 71
Every successful equality challenge that predates Law, therefore, invites an enquiry
into whether it would survive the Law analysis. Furthermore, a number of provincial
appellate and superior courts have considered somewhat similar issues concerning
the termination of certain income-security benefits at pension age. These courts
have upheld these cases either on the basis that, though in breach of s. 15, they were
justified by s. 1 of the Charter,9 or, more recently, that there was no breach of s. 15 at
all.1 0 These developments all call into question the status of Tdtreault-Gadoury and
whether it still represents good law as regards age discrimination.
In the following part of this note, we outline the approach adopted by the Supreme
Court in Ttreault-Gadoury and the subsequent moves away from that approach by
provincial appellate and superior courts. Then we look in detail at the more recent
Laronde11 decision and compares the approach adopted therein with the Supreme
Court's approach in Ttreault-Gadoury.
AGE DIFFERENTIATION AS STIGMATIZATION
As outlined above, the Ttreault-Gadoury case involved a provision of the
Unemployment Insurance Act 12 (1971) whereby, in the case of a person who had
reached age sixty-five or over, the normal unemployment benefit was not payable and
the person received instead a small lump-sum payment equivalent to three weeks'
benefit. The respondent had lost her job shortly after her sixty-fifth birthday and
applied for unemployment insurance benefits. This application was refused under
the impugned provision of the law. The Federal Court of Appeal subsequently found
that this rule was a breach of s. 15 that was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, and this
decision was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Canada. 13
The decision of the court followed that concerning mandatory retirement in McKinney
v. University of Guelph14 (1990) in which the court had ruled that such rules were in
breach of s. 15 but were justified under s. 1. That case was clearly fresh in the minds
of the judges as they approached the case very much from the standpoint of its im-
pact on Ms. Tdtreault-Gadoury's status in the labour market. The court's judgment
(delivered by La Forest J.) stated that the provisions of the Act permanently deprived
9. See Zaretski v. Saskatchewan (Workers Compensation Board) (1997), 156 Sask.R. 23, 148 DLR (4th) 745
(Q.B.) [Zaretski], aff'd (1998) 168 Sask. R. 57, 163 DLR (4th) 191, 1998 CanLII 12340 (C.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused, 26767 (28 January 1999). The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's judg-
ment in an extremely brief decision holding that, even if there were a breach of s. 15, the provision was
justified under s. 1 of the Charter.
10. See Laronde v. WHSCC and Attorney General of New Brunswick, 2007 NBCA 10 [Laronde].
11. Ibid.
12. Supra note 5, s. 31.
13. A separate aspect of the case-not discussed here-concerned whether an administrative tribunal
might apply the Charter without an express provision in that regard.
14. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229, 76 DLR (4th) 545, 1990 CanLII 60 [McKinney].
(2009) 22 Journal of Law and Social Policy
her of the status of a socially insured person by making her a pensioner of the state,
even if she were still looking for a new job.'5 It held there could be no doubt, follow-
ing McKinney, that if mandatory retirement provisions violate s. 15 of the Charter,
the denial of unemployment insurance benefits must also do so.16 The court held
that it stigmatized a person, regardless of her personal skills and situation, as belong-
ing to a group of people no longer part of the active population and perpetuated
the "insidious stereotype" that a person who is sixty-five years or older could not be
retrained for the labour market.
17
Having found a Charter breach, the court in Ttreault-Gadoury accepted that there
were two valid legislative objectives of the rule: (1) to prevent a person over sixty-five
from receiving a double benefit of both pension and unemployment benefits, and (2)
"to prevent the abuse of the Act by those who had already determined to retire from
the labour force', 18 presumably collecting unemployment insurance benefits without
conducting a viable job search and not having a genuine intention to return to the
work force. The court found that these legislative objectives, "when taken at face
value, are sufficient to meet the 'objectives test"' 19 demanded by s. 1 of the Charter.
However, it doubted that a third legislative objective-to tailor the unemployment
benefit scheme to fit within benefits for people over sixty-five-could, in itself, be
sufficiently important to justify the infringement of a Charter right.
20
Furthermore, in considering the proportionality of the Charter breach, the court fo-
cused on the principle of minimal impairment. It held that the law had not been care-
fully designed to achieve its valid legislative objectives and that it certainly did not
meet the "minimum impairment" requirement.21 The objective of preventing double
benefit could, for example, have been achieved by deducting pension receipts from
unemployment insurance benefits. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the provision
was in breach of s. 15 and as not saved by s. 1 of the Charter.
Subsequently, in Zaretski v. Saskatchewan (Workers Compensation Board)22 (1997),
another pre-Law decision, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench appeared to have
extended somewhat the Supreme Court's approach to a finding of age discrimination
15. Ttreault-Gadoury, supra note 4 at para. 35.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. at para. 41.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid. at para. 43.
21. Ibid. at para. 57.
22 Zaretski v. Saskatchewan (Workers Compensation Board) (1997), 156 Sask.R. 23, 148 DLR (4th) 745
(Q.B.) [Zaretski], aff'd (1998) 168 Sask. R. 57, 163 DLR (4th) 191, 1998 CanLII 12340 (C.A.), leave to
appeal to S.C.C. refused, 26767 (28 January 1999).
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under s. 15 of the Charter.23 The issue concerned a provision of provincial workers
compensation legislation that discontinued benefits at age sixty-five-the benefits
being replaced by much lower annuity benefits. The trial court pointed out that the
Supreme Court had held, in a series of mandatory retirement cases and in Titreault-
Gadoury, that age distinctions concerning issues such as continued employment and
the right to unemployment benefits were discriminatory under s. 15 of the Charter.24
It held that, having regard to the analysis of the Supreme Court in those cases, one
was "driven to conclude" that the provision in question did violate s. 15 as it denied
benefits to a class of workers identified "solely by virtue of age. 25
The trial court in Zaretski was "unable to distinguish" the circumstances of that case
from those considered in Titreault-Gadoury.26 However, there arguably is a distinc-
tion between the two cases. In failing to identify it, the court effectively extended the
rationale of the Supreme Court's decision, which turned on denial of access to the
labour market, to a broader rationale involving denial of access to income-security
benefits.
Nevertheless, the trial court in Zaretski did consider that the impugned rule consti-
tuted a reasonable limit under s. 1. In particular, it found that providing a uniform
retirement age that corresponded with other programs, and that limited financial
demands on the workers compensation fund, were important legislative objectives.
It held that the legislation was rationally connected with these objectives, and a pro-
portionate limit on the right of injured workers. In its s. 1 analysis, the trial court was
able to distinguish Titreault-Gadoury on the basis that the termination of benefits
in that case involved a greater degree of impairment than did the replacement of
income maintenance benefits by an annuity payment in Zaretski.
27
AGE DIFFERENTIATION AS DISCRIMINATION: LARONDE V. NEW BRUNSWICK
(WHSCC)
Laronde v. New Brunswick (Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation Commission)28
(2007) is a recent post-Law case very close in its facts to Zaretski. In Laronde, the
Court of Appeal of New Brunswick, in a carefully reasoned decision, has come to a
conclusion entirely different from that of the Saskatchewan court and has implicitly
23. The judgment was upheld on appeal by the Court of Appeal, which in a very short oral judgment
simply held that, assuming the provision were in breach of s. 15, it was satisfied that the lower court's
analysis as to s. 1 was correct. Therefore the discussion here focuses on the decision of the Court of
Queens Bench.
24. Supra note 9 at para. 42.
25. Ibid. at paras. 44-51.
26. Ibid. at para. 48.
27. Ibid. at pars. 52-82.
28 Laronde v. WHSCC and Attorney General of New Brunswick, 2007 NBCA 10 [Laronde].
(2009) 22 Journal of Law and Social Policy
questioned whether Tgtreault-Gadoury remains good law in the light of the Law
test.29
Under New Brunswick workers compensation legislation, once a person reaches
sixty-five years of age, long-term workers compensation benefits cease. Prior to
reaching age sixty-five, Mr. Laronde received about $1,500 per month in workers
compensation benefits and Canadian pension payments. On reaching age sixty-five,
the workers compensation benefits ceased, and he was paid a once-off annuity of
$11,437 (intended as compensation for a loss of pension income caused by the inabil-
ity to contribute to public and private pension plans during the period of incapacity
for work). 30 In addition, he received $1,262 monthly in both federal and provincial
old age pension payments. While the exact details are not apparent from the judg-
ment, one can assume that the termination of the workers compensation benefits left
Mr. Laronde worse off
The Court of Appeal applied the Law test to ascertain if this state of facts amounted
to discrimination. This test requires that (1) the law imposes differential treatment
between a person and others, (2) on one or more of the grounds enumerated in s.
15 (or analogous grounds) and (3) the law in question had a purpose or effect that is
discriminatory in that it denies human dignity.31 It was conceded that the first two
tests were satisfied and the case turned on the assessment of the third factor. The
Law judgment had further specified a number of contextual factors to be taken into
account in assessing whether human dignity had been infringed. These involved (1)
pre-existing disadvantage, (2) correspondence between the grounds of distinction
and the actual needs and circumstances of the affected group, (3) the ameliorative
purpose or effect of the impugned measure and (4) the nature and scope of the in-
terests involved.
Considering these factors in light of the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal ac-
cepted that older people were more prone to stereotypical attitudes or assumptions
that were factually unjustified. The court did not consider, however, that this dis-
crimination applied in the present case where the "notion" that the person could not
work was based on the fact that he was disabled, rather than on any stereotype. 32 In
29. Ibid. at para. 35, where the court remarked that "the Andrews framework was subsequently displaced
by the one provided for in Law. Fortunately, I do not have to speculate on whether Tgtreault-Gadoury
would be decided differently today."
30. Unfortunately we do not know what this equated to in monthly terms. The calculations are further
complicated by the fact that an overpayment was deducted from this annuity so the amount actual paid
to Mr. Laronde was lower.
31. See R. v. Kapp, 2008 SCC 41 at para 17, where the Supreme Court of Canada recently stated that its case
law had established in essence a two-part test for showing discrimination under s. 15(1): (1) Does the
law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground? (2) Does the distinction create a
disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping? The Court acknowledged that these tests were
divided, in Law, into three steps, but stated that in its view the test "is, in substance, the same."
32. Laronde, supra note 10 at para. 11.
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assessing the correspondence between the impugned distinction and the needs of the
affected group, Robertson J.A. (speaking for the court) noted the statements of the
majority of the Supreme Court in Gosselin.33 In Gosselin, the majority noted (1) per-
fect correspondence between a program and actual needs and circumstances was not
required, (2) one could not infer disparity between program and needs, based on the
mere failure of the government to prove that the assumptions on which the scheme
was based were justified and (3) an age chosen reasonably reflected the legislative
goal-the fact that some might prefer a different age did not indicate a lack of suffi-
cient correlation. 34 Applying this approach to the case, the court concluded that there
was no lack of correlation between the program and the needs and circumstances of
injured workers who reach age sixty-five. 35 The court did not find any ameliorative
purpose for the legislation and so found that the third factor was neutral. Finally, the
court (somewhat casually) stated that there was no evidence as to the impact of the
legislation on persons whose compensation was terminated at sixty-five. Therefore,
the court found, no evidence that such termination forces workers to live at or below
the poverty line. Accordingly the court did not find that this factor favoured a finding
of discrimination. Overall, given that only the first factor (pre-existing disadvantage)
did support such a finding, the court was satisfied that the termination of benefits
did not undermine the human dignity of those over sixty-five and did not constitute
discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter.
The Court of Appeal shortly dismissed the value of Titreault-Gadoury as a precedent,
pointing out that it had been decided long before Law and had been referred to only
in passing in that case and in Gosselin. Robertson J.A. also distinguished the case
on the facts, pointing out that the rules in question provided longer "transitional"
benefits than did those in the older case.
36
So where does this leave Tgtreault-Gadoury? Clearly it was decided long before Law
and does not specifically apply the four s. 15 factors outlined in that judgment.
However, one can, in fact, ascertain from the judgment clear indications of how
the court would have decided these issues (for ease of comparison, the relevant
factors are set out in table form). First, like the Court of Appeal in Laronde, the
Supreme Court in Ttreault-Gadoury clearly believed that older people were sub-
ject to pre-existing disadvantages in access to the labour market. Unlike the Court
of Appeal, the Supreme Court took the view that there was a lack of correspond-
ence between the impugned provisions and the circumstances of the respondent in
that case. Again, the third factor (ameliorative purpose) was neutral. The Supreme
Court differed, however, from the Court of Appeal on the fourth factor (the interests
33. Supra note 7.
34. Ibid. at paras. 55-57. See also the rather different approach proposed by Bastarache J. (dissenting) in
that case at paras. 239-49.
35. Laronde, supra note 10 at paras. 13-29.
36. Ibid., at para 35. Robertson J.A., at para 36, similarly disposed of Zaretski, supra note 9.
(2009) 22 Journal of Law and Social Policy
affected), focusing on the loss of status as a socially insured person, rather than a
pure financial loss.
Table 1: Contextual factors in assessing discrimination
Factor T6treault-Gadoury Laronde
Pre-existing disadvantage Yes Yes (but questioned relevance to the facts of the
case)
Correspondence No Yes (following Gosselin)
Ameliorative purpose None None
Interests affected Loss of status No evidence of serious impact
It appears that the critical difference between the two decisions arises under the
second and fourth factors-correspondence and interests affected. These are related,
in part, to the factual differences in the two cases in that one involved employment/
unemployment whereas the other involved a person incapable of work. The interest
found by the Supreme Court to be affected in Titreault-Gadoury (loss of status as a
socially insured person) did not arise (or did not arise in the same way) in Laronde,
where the person was not being forced to become a state pensioner but simply moved
from being a recipient of pension and workers compensation benefits to being a re-
cipient of pension benefits (and a lump-sum provided by the workers compensa-
tion scheme).37 However, the second aspect (correspondence) cannot so readily be
disposed of on the facts. In Ttreault-Gadoury the Court applied a very strict test,
holding that the "mandatory retirement" involved in that case constituted age dis-
crimination that was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter-a finding that perhaps
misled the Saskatchewan court in Zaretski into holding that age distinctions in rela-
tion to access to another income-security benefit were also discriminatory.
However, the Supreme Court in Gosselin has made in clear that in a s. 15 analysis of
"discrimination', perfect correspondence is not required. Given the evidence (dis-
cussed in Laronde) that 86 per cent of the Canadian workforce retires by age sixty-
five,38 one might wonder whether an assumption that people will retire at sixty-five
is not sufficiently close to present-day societal facts to justify a finding of corres-
pondence. As most income-security programs are designed on the assumption that
workers will have retired at age sixty-five, this may justify such a finding. However,
in specific circumstances the interests involved or other facts may be found to out-
weigh the factor of correspondence in the overall assessment of whether a measure
infringes human dignity.
37. One might, however, be somewhat critical of this aspect of the Laronde decision in that it must be
assumed that Mr. Laronde was financially worse off to some quantifiable amount as a result of the
termination of benefits and that some data as to the broader issue must surely be available that would
have allowed a clearer assessment of the impact.
38. Supra note 35 at para. 25.
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CONCLUSION
As we have seen in this note, the 1991 finding by the Supreme Court that termination
of unemployment benefits at age sixty-five is in breach of the Charter (and not justi-
fied under s. 1) has been called into question by more recent developments. In part,
this is because the decision in Ttreault-Gadoury-in the context of cases on manda-
tory retirement-focused heavily on that aspect of the case and can be distinguished
on the facts from cases involving termination of other income-security benefits that
do not involve withdrawal from the labour force.
However, the rather strict approach to correspondence between a program and the
needs and circumstances of individuals applied in that case is also now called into
question by the Gosselin judgment with its emphasis on a more flexible approach.
Nonetheless, it may still be the case that Ttreault-Gadoury is correctly decided on
its own particular facts. Even if one were to now apply the Law test to those facts
and, following Gosselin, come to a less damning conclusion about the lack of cor-
respondence between the assumption that persons would retire at sixty-five and the
needs and circumstances of the respondent in Ttreault-Gadoury, a court might still
conclude that human dignity was affected. This likelihood is due to the level of pre-
existing disadvantage on this point, and the nature and scope of the interests affected.
However, it seems unlikely that Canadian courts would now expand the outcome
of Ttreault-Gadoury to cases involving a potential overlap between other income-
security benefits and pension age.
A number of authors have been rather critical of the emphasis on human dignity in
equality jurisprudence following Law. Some have argued that the requirement that a
provision must impair human dignity to violate s. 15 is reverting to an idea rejected
in earlier jurisprudence that the equality guarantee applies only to "unreasonable
or unfair" distinctions.39 The Supreme Court of Canada has recently responded to
these criticisms, accepting that
human dignity is an abstract and subjective notion that, even with the guidance of the four
contextual factors, cannot only become confusing and difficult to apply; it also proven to
be an additional burden on equality claimants, rather than the philosophical enhancement
it was intended to be.
40
In an apparent move away from a reliance on human dignity, the Court stated that
analysis of discrimination in a particular case focuses more usefully on "perpetua-
tion of disadvantage and stereotyping as the primary indicators of discrimination
" 4 1
However, in Laronde, as in a number of other Canadian cases, it is largely the degree
39. See PW Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Scarborough: Thomson Canada, 2006), at 1168. For
a contrary view, see D. Greschner, "Does Law Advance the Cause of Equality" (2001) 27 Queen's L.J.
299.
40. Kapp, supra note 31 at para 22 (as are subsequent quotations in this paragraph).
41. It is as yet too early to predict how this apparent change will affect equality jurisprudence. For an early
example see Harris v. Minister for Human Resources and Skills Development, 2009 FCA22.
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of correspondence between the impugned distinction and the "needs and circum-
stances" that a court will require-or conversely the margin of discretion allowed
to the state-that is the critical factor in whether or not a breach of s. 15 is found.
The "correspondence" issue is also found in similar jurisprudence in the United
States Supreme Court or the European Court of Human Rights.42 Therefore, it is
not perhaps only the emphasis on human dignity per se that makes it more difficult
to advance a successful argument under s. 15, but rather the overall view that the
Supreme Court of Canada takes on the degree of oversight that it should apply to
state action.
42. In the case of the U.S. Supreme Court, as is well known, outside limited cases that require heightened
scrutiny, the Court normally requires only a "rational" relationship between the distinction made by
the law and some governmental objective (see, for example, L.M. Seidman, Constitutional Law: Equal
Protection of the Laws [New York: Foundation, 2002]). And, in contrast to the Canadian approach
under s. 1 of the Charter, the U.S. courts' examination of such "rationality" is normally superficial at
best. Similarly, with the exception of issues (such as nationality or, to a lesser extent, gender) where the
European Court of Human Rights will require "very weighty reasons" to justify a distinction, the Court
normally allows a wide margin of discretion when it comes to general measures of economic or social
strategy (in the context of social security, see M. Cousins, The European Court of Human Rights and
Social Security Law [Antwerp: Intersentia, 2008]).
